Rage Against the National Lobotomy of Filipinos

“To be ignorant of what occurred before you were born is to remain always a child." - Marcus Tullius Cicero

Pied Pipers of Ignorance

On 15 December 2023, Philippine Department of Defense Secretary Gibo Teodoro said that the “West Philippine Sea” is a “more valuable target than Taiwan.” That Taiwan is less valuable than the West Philippine Sea is based on Teodoro’s questionable appreciation of things.

The fact is in the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, it categorically says that: “Taiwan is part of the sacred territory of the People’s Republic of China. It is the sacred duty of all the Chinese people, including our fellow Chinese in Taiwan, to achieve the great reunification of the motherland.” And in September 2023, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan that Taiwan is “the foremost inviolable red line in China-US relations.”

Taiwan is in the same category as “Shandong” during the negotiations of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, which ended the First World War and determined the fate of the territories occupied by Germany, including those they had in the Pacific. China supported the Allied Powers against Germany on the condition that Shandong would be returned to China. Shandong was a colony of Germany (in the same vein as Hong Kong was a colony of the United Kingdom).

At that time, Japan already had the status of a Great Power after defeating Russia in the 1905 Battle of Tsushima. As EH Carr said in 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗧𝘄𝗲𝗻𝘁𝘆 𝗬𝗲𝗮𝗿𝘀’𝘀 𝗖𝗿𝗶𝘀𝗶𝘀, 𝟭𝟵𝟭𝟵-𝟭𝟵𝟯𝟵: 𝗔𝗻 𝗜𝗻𝘁𝗿𝗼𝗱𝘂𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝘁𝗼 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗦𝘁𝘂𝗱𝘆 𝗼𝗳 𝗜𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗻𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝗮𝗹 𝗥𝗲𝗹𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝘀, one of the foundational texts of the field of International Relations, “recognition as a Great Power is normally the reward of fighting a successfully large-scale war. Germany after the Franco-Prussian War, the United States after the war with Spain, and Japan after the Russo-Japanese War.” Japan became a member of the Great Power Club of the West.

China’s military was weak at that time, forced to sign humiliating treaties that led to it being partitioned by several Great Powers in the 19th century. As outcomes of peace treaties are largely shaped by the interests of the Great Powers, the leasehold of Shandong was transferred to Japan. Japan was also given the mandate over the Pacific holdings of Germany, which Japan incorporated into its territory as Nihon Inin Tōchi-ryō Nan'yō Guntō. Later on, after World War II, the United States took possession of them and became “the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.”

China protested and refused to sign the 1919 Treaty of Versailles. For China, it was unthinkable to relinquish Shandong. It is a sacred territory because it was the birthplace of Confucius.

During the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, Dr. V.K. Willington Koo, the delegate sent by Bejing to negotiate the Treaty of Versailles, passionately plead that Shandong Province be returned back to China and not be given as a reward to Japan. Koo said:

The Shandong Province in which Jiaozhou and the railway to Jinanfu were situated was the cradle of Chinese civilization, the birthplace of Confucius and Mencius and a Holy Land for the Chinese…Strategically, Jiaozhou commanded one of the main gateways of North China. It controlled one of the shortest approaches from the sea to Beijing, namely the railway to Jinanfu, which at its junction with the railways from Tianjin, led straight to the capital.

The United States mediated between Japan and China, and eventually Shandong was rightfully returned to China in the 1922 Nine-Power Treaty.

That is the comparable status of Taiwan in the 21st century: as sacred as Shandong. The South China Sea isn’t even mentioned in the Chinese Constitution. To call Taiwan, considered a “sacred territory” and a “red line” by China, less valuable than the recently invented (2012) “West Philippine Sea” demonstrates, at best, a very questionable reading of history, at worst, a deliberate attempt to mislead the public.

𝗣𝗵𝗶𝗹𝗶𝗽𝗽𝗶𝗻𝗲 𝗨𝗻𝗿𝗲𝗮𝗹𝗶𝘀𝗺

It is not realistic for either the Philippines, Vietnam, or China (by which I mean the undivided China) to give up their sovereignty claims in the Spratlys and even in the Scarborough Shoal. These intersecting sovereignty claims are there. It is a fact.

The Chinese enduring guide for policy is: 实事求是 (Shíshìqiúshì). This policy philosophy is about 2,000 years old, appearing first in the Book of Han (111 CE). This expression is too precious for China that there is a stele erected in Beijing containing the expression. The literal meaning of this idiom is: “Seek Truth from Facts.” It originated from the Ancient Chinese scholars’ approach to studying reality. Its deeper meaning is committing to a practical, realistic, and truthful approach. Its direct corollary in Western philosophy is the philosophy of pragmatism of William James.

China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea do not belong in the same category of “sacredness” as Taiwan. Taiwan becoming a separate State from the mainland is absolutely non-negotiable for China. 原则底线 (yuánzé dǐxiàn) is the most important concept in Chinese foreign policy that anyone should remember. It means "principled bottomline." What it means in practice is "China will not sacrifice its core interests to maintain peace." China’s four bottomline core interests are: Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. These are China’s non-negotiables; the rest are negotiables.

Taiwan formally seceding from the mainland is like Mindanao separating from the Philippines to become an independent State. The Philippine Department of National Defence commented against this characterisation. Yet they are silent about Risa Hontiveros, a Philippine senator, openly declaring herself as an ally of Taiwan's independence, SEVERAL TIMES.

In April 2023, Hotiveros released a statement:

"the Philippines will never interfere with the issue of Taiwanese independence. That is exclusively for the people of Taiwan to tackle. We, in the Philippines, respect the right of the Taiwanese people to self-determination, and this right must be upheld by all other nations that share this planet, even including the autocratic regime of China."

Her statement is ridiculous. She said the Philippines will not interfere with the issue of Taiwan's independence yet she supports their secession?

After that statement in May 2023, Hontiveros met with the president of Taiwan. It was her first visit to Taiwan in her entire life. The page of the president of Taiwan said: "Senator Hontiveros has long backed Taiwan and our international participation, the president thanked her for her longstanding support."

In May 2024, she said in a statement:

"I want to assure the new Taiwanese President, Lai Ching-te, that he has allies in the Philippines."

Perhaps Hontiveros is ignorant of the position of Taiwan (Republic of China) on the South China Sea?

The South China Sea claims are negotiable for the Chinese. Filipino decision-makers kept emphasising China’s POSITION on this matter, that it has indisputable sovereignty over the Spratlys and its adjacent waters while overlooking the fact that Vietnam is also claiming that. Rigoberto Tiglao expressed this so well in his article 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗿𝗼𝗮𝗱 𝗳𝗼𝗿𝘄𝗮𝗿𝗱 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝗦𝗖𝗦 𝗱𝗶𝘀𝗽𝘂𝘁𝗲𝘀: 𝗗𝗿𝗼𝗽 𝘀𝗼𝘃𝗲𝗿𝗲𝗶𝗴𝗻𝘁𝘆 𝗱𝗲𝗯𝗮𝘁𝗲𝘀 (June 30, 2023):

That US view of China as an expansionist power, translates to the mentality espoused by Aquino 3rd in his slogan “what-is-ours-is-ours” and by Marcos Jr.’s “we-will-not give-up-an inch.” That precludes any compromise solution not only to our disputes with China, but with Vietnam, Taiwan and Malaysia. But we have to face reality: At this time it has become moot and academic today to argue which country has the legitimate sovereignty over the islands and reefs in the SCS.

The consistent policy of China in the sovereignty dispute is to shelve the sovereignty issue.

On 20 May 1997, in his column in the Manila Bulletin, Salvador Laurel published an article entitled 𝑳𝒆𝒕’𝒔 𝑯𝒆𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑹𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒐 𝑶𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑺𝒑𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒍𝒚 𝑰𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆. Laurel was recounting his June 1986 meeting with Deng Xiaoping. Laurel went to Beijing as Minister of Foreign Affairs of the revolutionary government of Corazon Aquino.

From the Salvador H. Laurel Museum and Library

The issue of the Spratly Islands came up. Deng reiterated the Chinese position that it is theirs. Yet Deng also said: “China and the Philippines can talk about how we can jointly develop those islands. But let us not talk about who owns them because we will never agree.” China’s position never changed.

But for the emotionally-driven Filipino policy makers, they will overlook the “jointly develop” part and will focus on the Chinese position that the Spratly’s are theirs. This led to the Philippines being stuck in eternal sabre-rattling game with China and megaphone diplomacy that achieves nothing beneficial to the nation, except serving as an ego trip of Filipino politicians and policy-makers.

Joint development is China’s consistent position on the Spratly’s. This is a very important policy difference between other areas the Chinese claim sovereignty over, such as Hong Kong. For China, there’s no talk of joint development with the British over Hong Kong. No talk of joint development with Portugal over Macau. They must be returned to China; and returned they did. Regarding the Taiwan issue, it is sacred territory. No joint development there with the United States, which considers Taiwan as part of its defensive perimeter in the Pacific.

Filipino policy makers are stuck with the “indisputable sovereignty” position of China over the Spratlys and its adjacent waters. They do not see any difference in the gradients of Chinese positions in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Spratly’s and the South China Sea. And there lies the tragedy of Philippine foreign policy.

Thus, Filipino foreign policy establishment doesn’t think “joint development” is good policy. Foreign policy pundit darlings of mainstream media kept framing this as “capitulation” or “appeasement.” But how come no Chinese scholar or foreign policy maker see this as capitulation of their country when they approach this from a “joint development” perspective? In fact, Chinese scholars (e.g. by Huaigao Qi) have published several articles exploring joint development and cooperation that could be undertaken by the claimants. As both China and the Philippines assert indisputable sovereignty, surely the consequence of that would be both of them seeing “joint development” as appeasement and capitulation. The reality is: China wants to pursue joint development with the Philippines despite their position that they have indisputable sovereignty.

That is the wisdom behind what Deng said to Laurel: “let us not talk about who owns them because we will never agree.”

Ownership is a zero-sum game. Administration is not. One can jointly administer an area, sharing rights and most significantly sharing responsibilities, without resolving the underlying sovereignty issue first.

And this actually creates the material conditions for the future resolution of the conflict based on the synthesis of two opposing positions. Because if China and the Philippines and other claimants create a long history of joint development, which implies joint administration, the future resolution would not be based on total exclusion of each other but in a more inclusive structure that is not based on the Western-notion of territoriality.

To understand this, we must compare Philippine territorial dispute with China and Malaysia. Malaysia and the Philippines have territorial disputes over Sabah. But are we jointly developing Sabah? Our previous policy makers could have proposed to Malaysia to jointly develop Sabah rather than engage in an all-or-nothing approach. That idiotic approach of previous Philippine governments now produced this material condition: Malaysia exclusively enjoys Sabah. If we pursued joint development then, we could perhaps been cushioned from the oil crisis of the 70s.

The application of the all-or-nothing Sabah approach to the South China Sea issue would lead to a situation not favourable to the Philippines in the long run. But perhaps our policy makers are hoping it won't. Hope, however, is not a good foundation for policy. Hope, is at best, a way to massage one’s ego. At worst, a recipe for disaster.

𝗖𝗵𝗶𝗻𝗮 𝗶𝘀 𝗲𝘃𝗶𝗹?

To say that China has shown restraint on the South China Sea issue is the best way to be demonised by a hysterical mob. This has been the fate of international relations scholar John Mearsheimer who warned against including Ukraine into NATO.

In 2015, John Mearsheimer delivered a lecture in the University of Chicago entitled 𝑾𝒉𝒚 𝒊𝒔 𝑼𝒌𝒓𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑾𝒆𝒔𝒕’𝒔 𝑭𝒂𝒖𝒍𝒕? You can watch the lecture on You Tube:

The lecture became more popular in 2022. Mearsheimer has been accused of just spreading Russian propaganda.

The basis of this accusation are three-fold: 1) the fact that, in 2019, Mearsheimer received an award from Valdai Discussion Club, a Moscow-based think tank, for his book The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities; 2) the fact that he received funding from Valdai for his 2023 How States Think, which he acknowledged in the foreword of the book; and 3) the fact that Mearsheimer received funding from Koch Foundations, dismissed of just simply being pro-Russia.

Together, it’s a perfect recipe to villainise Mearsheimer. To dismiss his scholarly works as mere “Russian propaganda.” In September 2023, 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝑵𝒆𝒘 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒔𝒎𝒂𝒏 even published an article entitled: “The Tragedy of Mearsheimer: How the American Realist Became the World’s Most Hated Thinker.”

Sounds familiar? Yes. That’s also the same mud Filipino policy makers, mainstream media, and the mercenary bloggers of the Marcos administration are throwing against those dousing Filipino jingoism fires with the same realism of Mearsheimer. The purpose of this mud-throwing isn’t clarity but to keep the public locked into singleness of purpose disguised as calls for unity. Unity has become a catchphrase of this administration for lack of realistic policy.

Mearsheimer is one of the very few international scholars who were warning against the West’s move in Ukraine. Let me point you to one of the questions asked to Mearsheimer during his 2015 lecture (You Tube, 47:05-47:32)

Questioner: “Is there anybody listening to you and Steven Cohen…and partial Kissinger? Is there anybody listening that we could vote to hope for?”

Mearsheimer: No one

Questioner: So we’re really doomed? There’s no enlightenment in store…

Kissinger’s March 2014 article in the Washington’s Post 𝑯𝒐𝒘 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑼𝒌𝒓𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒆 𝑪𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒔 𝑬𝒏𝒅𝒔 was required reading to our class when I was still a student of Foreign Policy & Diplomacy at Leiden University, under a former NATO Secretary-General. That article proposed a policy direction, which of course wasn’t taken because it is demonised to be mere appeasement rather than a policy informed by reality and not by our mere emotional relation to events.

This emotional blinder is the same blinder that former British Prime Minister Tony Blair on the road to his decision to commit the United Kingdom to the U.S. invasion of Iraq.

Realist political philosopher Raymond Geuss shared this story during his 2013 lecture on Marxism in Cambridge University (17:36-18:18) :

“Tony Blair was about to invade Iraq. And this group of people come up to him who are experts in Iraq and they said, ‘You know you might have some problems here. You should think about this. Look there are different groups in this. Iraq was cut out from the Ottoman Empire at a certain…”

That group proceeded to inform Blair of the historical-structural conditions of Iraq, warning him “You might have some problems when you just come in and smash everything up.” To which Blair replied: “But Saddam Hussein is evil, isn’t he?”

The lesson: When a nation is driven to the point of hysteria, any explanation not aligned with that hysteria would be lynched by a mob.

The South China Sea territorial dispute has shown that China, compared to other superpowers faced by a comparable situation, is more restraint.

China has been in that territorial dispute longer than the Philippines. The reason why the fate of the Spratly’s was left hanging in the 1956 San Francisco Treaty, which ended the war against Japan, was because France and China were staking claims in the same area. Thus, the wording of Article 2(f) of that Treaty was just worded as: “Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Spratly Islands and to the Paracel Islands.” Japan renounced them but no statement to whom they should be returned.

In a 1975 White Paper of the Republic of Vietnam, the Vietnamese interpreted that paragraph in conjunction with other paragraphs in Article 2. And their interpretation made them conclude that Vietnam was the rightful heir of whatever the Japanese renounced under that Treaty. On the other hand, the Philippines interpreted it differently. As stated in PD1596 of Marcos Sr, which annexed a portion of the Spratly’s and renamed it as Kalayaan Island Group, the Spratly’s are “res nullius,” which means legally belonging to no one. The position of the Philippines was the Spratly’s must be put under the Trusteeship of the Allied Powers.

China (both the Communists and the Nationalists, which became exiled in Taiwan) do not accept these interpretations. China didn’t sign the 1956 San Francisco Treaty. The Chinese weren’t invited because the United Kingdom and the United States recognised two different governments of China as a whole: the United Kingdom recognised the Communist Party of China’s early as 1950, while the United States recognised the Kuomintang (the Nationalists).

During the Chinese civil war, the Kuomintang occupied Itu Aba to solidify the Chinese claim over Spratly’s. Itu Aba the largest island in the Spratlys was occupied by China (then still under the Kuomintang government) in 1956. At that time, the infamous nine-dash line was called the “U-shaped line,” meant to indicate interests of China in the South China Sea.

It’s not hard to understand why China took possession of Itu Aba first. During that time, the prevailing norm in international law is what Max Huber wrote in his decision in the 1928 Islands of Palmas Case (U.S. vs Netherlands):

"As regards groups of islands, it is possible that a group may under certain circumstances be regarded as in law a unit, and that 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗳𝗮𝘁𝗲 𝗼𝗳 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗽𝗿𝗶𝗻𝗰𝗶𝗽𝗮𝗹 𝗽𝗮𝗿𝘁 𝗺𝗮𝘆 𝗶𝗻𝘃𝗼𝗹𝘃𝗲 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗿𝗲𝘀𝘁. Here, however, we must distinguish between, on the one hand, the act of first taking possession, which can hardly extend to every portion of territory, and, on the other hand, 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗱𝗶𝘀𝗽𝗹𝗮𝘆 𝗼𝗳 𝘀𝗼𝘃𝗲𝗿𝗲𝗶𝗴𝗻𝘁𝘆 𝗮𝘀 𝗮 𝗰𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗶𝗻𝘂𝗼𝘂𝘀 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗽𝗿𝗼𝗹𝗼𝗻𝗴𝗲𝗱 𝗺𝗮𝗻𝗶𝗳𝗲𝘀𝘁𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝘄𝗵𝗶𝗰𝗵 𝗺𝘂𝘀𝘁 𝗺𝗮𝗸𝗲 𝗶𝘁𝘀𝗲𝗹𝗳 𝗳𝗲𝗹𝘁 𝘁𝗵𝗿𝗼𝘂𝗴𝗵 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝘄𝗵𝗼𝗹𝗲 𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗿𝗶𝘁𝗼𝗿𝘆.” (emphasis mine)

It was only in the 2016 South China Sea Arbitration decision that the Spratly’s is no longer considered a “unity.” But for the longest time in its history, Vietnam, China (both Beijing and Taipei), Japan, and the Philippines have their own understanding of its “unity.”

China (both Beijing and Taipei) still considers the Spratlys as an archipelago (Nánshā Qúndǎo). Vietnam also considers the Spratly’s as an archipelago (Quần đảo Trường Sa). The position of the Philippines is still not clear. The Philippines, however, has no choice but to accept that the South China Sea Arbitration decision has already invalidated the unity of the Kalayaan Island Group in Marcos Sr's PD1596 claim, a matter not discussed in public.

After 1956, Vietnam and the Philippines became active in militarily occupying the different features of the Spratlys. In this scramble for the Spratly features, Vietnam emerged as the clear winner — about 29, more than the combined possessions of other major claimants: Philippines = 10. China = 9 (including Itu Aba). Vietnam and the Philippine took advantage of the military weakness and internal instability of China.

Most of what China currently occupies were a result of its naval battle with Vietnam in 1988, which was a consequence of their battle over the Paracels extending to the Spratly’s. After six years, China occupied Mischief Reef (1994). And after 18 years, China became the sole occupant of Scarborough Shoal after the United States advised the Philippines to withdraw from the shoal in 2012.

These are important facts that I want to bring to the surface which are being muddied by charlatans and emotionally-driven pundits, who are raising the hysteria that China is just evil.

China could have taken advantaged of the 1986 EDSA Uprising; the 1987 coup d’etat against Aquino; and the 2001 EDSA Uprising. These are periods when the Philippine military was pre-occupied in internal strife. China could have also taken advantaged as well of Yolanda tragedy in 2013 to tow away the BRP Sierra Madre. Yet China did not. It is a fact.

While being in the possession of Mischief Reef since 1994, it was only in 2014 that Chinese proceeded to build an artificial island. That’s after 20 years. That’s a fact. The modus vivendi in Scarborough Shoal before 2012 was Filipino and Chinese fishermen, even Vietnamese fishermen, were jointly operating there. This is clearly stated in Paragraph 761 of the 2016 South China Sea Arbitration Decision:

The Tribunal accepted as “accurate” both the claims of the Philippines and China “to have traditionally fished at the [Scarborough Shoal]” (Paragraph 805).

Thus, the Tribunal accepted in good faith their declarations even if the Tribunal “does not have before it extensive details of the fishing methods traditionally used by either Filipino or Chinese fishermen, or of the communities that have traditionally dispatched vessels to Scarborough Shoal” (Paragraph 806)

The same are noted by the Tribunal in other parts of the South China Sea.

China emerged as the sole occupant as a result of the escalation of 2012 Scarborough Shoal stand-off. These are facts. And the preponderance of facts show that China has shown restraint for a long time and that China’s consistent policy is joint development. However, it is also equally true that China would insist on maintaining its position of “indisputable sovereignty” and acting on it if other claimants would also be insisting on this zero-sum game.

On May 7, 1999, during the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, guided bombs of the United States hit the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. Three Chinese diplomats died, and at least 20 were injured. The United States called it an accident.

The Chinese were understandably angry. The Chinese diplomats were in a state of grief over the deaths of their colleagues. The Chinese military wanted decisive action. Meanwhile, the Communists Party of China was struggling to maintain order, huge demonstrations erupted in different Chinese cities, lasting for several days.

The Philippines deliberately run aground one of its very few warships, the BRP Sierra Madre, in Ayungin Shoal on May 9, 1999. A retaliation towards the Chinese occupation of Mischief Reef. This is kicking your enemy when they are grieving.

Imagine if China took advantage of the Marawi Siege in 2017. Imagine if instead of sending military aid to the Philippines, the Chinese ignored the Philippines and left it alone. Wasn’t it a perfect opportunity for China to watch the Philippine military bleed? Wasn’t it a perfect opportunity for China to tow away the BRP Sierra Madre? To ask these questions is to imagine the profundity of what China thought of what the Philippines did two days after the United States “accidentally” bombed its embassy in Belgrade.

Yet this perspective will surely be lost among those who have no sense of sober reading of history. And just like the fate of Mearsheimer, those who dared to raise these points would be villainised and hated by those so deep into the cult of jingoism.

Reinhold Niebuhr, another great Christian realist philosopher, once said: “Rationality belongs to the cool observer, but because of the stupidity of the average man, he follows not reason, but faith, and the naïve faith requires necessary illusion and emotionally potent oversimplifications which are provided by the myth-maker to keep ordinary person on course.”

In Philippine context, these myth-makers are those who cannot separate their feelings from facts. These myth-makers will constantly demonise pragmatism over dogmatism. These myth-makers will also be the last ones who would send their children to die when the tension escalated into a shooting war. These myth-makers don’t care about history, they don’t promote good policy based on reality. All they want is for people to believe in their faith called “Atin To.”

These are the same myth-makers who were celebrating Marcos Jr hoodwinking his voters that he would continue Duterte’ foreign policy; and these are the same myth-makers who are now worried about the escalation of tensions in the South China Sea. And they aren’t honest enough to reflect whether their celebration is compatible with their worries. Because honesty is never the point of these myth-makers. Their point is very simple, and if you don’t believe it you are a traitor. Their responsorial psalm: “China is Evil.”

Crude oil for “friendship price” — is this evil?

The 1974 oil crisis demonstrates how the dependence on Western countries was devastating to the Philippines.

The Philippines was highly dependent on Chevron and Shell. Chevron is a US company; Shell is a Dutch company. The US and the Netherlands supported Israel in the Arab-Israeli War Yom Kippur War.

In retaliation to the US and the Netherlands, Arab oil-producing countries imposed an oil-embargo against them.

The price of crude oil per barrel went up from $3 to $12. The Netherlands and the United States restricted supplying oil to other countries to priorities their own economies. The Philippines was gravely affected.

As Severino Samonte recounted in a 2022 article in Philippine News Agency reported:

In the Philippines, the administration of then President Ferdinand E. Marcos Sr. (1965-1986) had to implement strict energy conservation measures with the cooperation of law enforcement agencies and the barangay councils.

Such measures included the putting up of so-called "taxicab stands" in key places in the then Greater Manila Area where commuters usually converged, like Plaza Miranda in Quiapo, Sta. Cruz, Escolta, the Rizal Park, Cubao in Quezon City and the Makati business district.

Under this scheme, cab drivers were prevented from cruising around and wasting precious fuels without passengers. They were instead required to stay in the taxicab stands and wait for passengers there. Those found by the police and barangay officials violating this restriction were penalized with high fines, and even imprisonment.

A "share-a-ride" scheme among commuters was also implemented. It became acceptable to riders going to the same direction because they spent less by just sharing part in the total fare. Commuters were not afraid to ride with total strangers in this system because of the prevailing peace and order condition brought about by the Marcos declaration a year earlier of martial law nationwide.

As the OPEC oil embargo also caused the prices of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) to double, many families, particularly in the Greater Manila Area, were forced to return to the use of firewood and sawdust in cooking their meals.

Which country Marcos Sr government turned to during this time? The People’s Republic of China, still led by Mao Zedong.

The late Benito Lim, a distinguished professor at the Asian Center of the University of the Philippines, recounted this in the 1999 The Political Economy of Philippines-China Relations.

In March 1974, Ambassador Benjamin Romualdez went to Beijing to continue talks for normalization of relations. In July-August of the same year, Ambassador Romualdez made three more trips to arrange for Mrs. Imelda Marcos proposed visit from September 20 to 27, 1974 upon the invitation of Prime Minister Zhou Enlai.

Mrs. Marcos concluded a trade agreement providing for sale by China of petroleum, and purchase of major export products from the Philippines….

Ten months before normalization, the PRC government had already demonstrated their willingness to help ease the economic difficulties of the Philippines brought about by the steep increase of oil prices. On September 25, 1974 an agreement was signed for China to sell high quality petroleum to the Philippines and in turn buy Philippine products such as coconut oil, lumber, sugar, copper ore, and other metals. The initial shipment of 125,000 barrels of crude oil was delivered in October of that year…

On October 13, 1980 a loan amounting to US$30 million from the People’s Republic was obtained to pay for the purchase of 500 mini-hydro power plants. The agreement was signed by President Marcos and Ambassador Chen Hsin Jen. On August 6, 1981, for the first time in the Philippines’ post war history, a Chinese Prime Minister came on a four-day state visit to the Philippines. Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang’s entourage included Li Qiang, Minister of Foreign Trade, Chen Chu, Deputy Secretary General of State Council and others. Zhao agreed to continue to supply crude oil to the Philippines at concessional prices. The oil deal was one of the three issues President Marcos discussed with Prime Minister Zhao. Other issues were Philippine purchase of high grade coal from China and increased Chinese importation of Philippine coconut oil.

The nine-dash line boogeyman: American propaganda after its Pivot to Asia

The Google Ngram Viewer is a tool that visually represents the frequency of specific search keywords by analysing the occurrence of n-grams in printed sources from 1500 to 2019 that Google has digitalised. This tool is available online: https://books.google.com/ngrams.

As you can see, the preponderance of discussion about the nine-dash line proliferated after 2009, coinciding with U.S. Pivot to Asia policy during the Obama administration. Yet the nine-dash line has been there since 1948! This is a FACT that even the 2016 South China Sea Arbitration Tribunal has recognized:

Yup, it was the Republican Government of China that put that in the Chinese map. The Republican Government (Kuomintang) that was defeated during the Chinese civil war, the allies of the United States, which retreated to the Taiwan Island. Yet as you could see in the n-gram, discussions about this from 1945 till 2009 are VERY RARE. If it is indeed something that we must be worried about, how come the worry came MORE THAN FIFTY YEARS AFTER ITS FIRST OFFICIAL APPEARANCE ON OFFICIAL CHINESE MAPS WHICH THE UNITED STATES KNOW AND EVEN TOLERATED BECAUSE IT WAS DRAWN BY THEIR ALLIES AMONG THE CHINESE — THE KUOMINTANG?

The 2016 South China Sea Arbitration (Award) decision provides that “the ‘nine-dash line’…cannot provide a basis for any entitlement by China to maritime zones in the area of Mischief Reef or Second Thomas Shoal that would overlap the entitlement of the Philippines to an exclusive economic zone and continental shelf generated from baselines on the island of Palawan” (Paragraph 631). This has been interpreted by Carpio et al that China has no valid sovereignty claim over the Second Thomas Shoal. A closer reading of the decision proves that this is not the case.

First, the arbitration decision is not about territorial sovereignty.

Second, the decision dealt with the nine-dash line as the basis of the maritime claim of China and not the status of Second Thomas Shoal within the Nansha Qundao (Spratly Island Group), which China claims to be where that shoal belongs. The 2016 South China Sea Arbitration decision just declared it as within the EEZ and continental shelf of the Philippines, which is a simple geographical determination. BUT the decision has not dealt with whether it is part of China’s Nansha Qundao or Vietnam’s Trường Sa, or the Philippines’ Kalayaan Island Group.

The Philippines devolved its claim from “territorial sovereignty” to just “sovereign rights.” The Philippine claim is less than the claim of Vietnam and China. Until the territorial sovereignty claim has been resolved, the “sovereign rights” claim of the Philippines cannot be effectively enforced because there is an outstanding territorial sovereignty claim based on China’s Nansha and Vietnam's Truong Sa claims

Paragraph 272 of the 2016 South China Sea Arbitration (Award) is a sobering caveat on the issue of territorial sovereignty and whether the decision can be used to say that China has no valid sovereignty claim:

Again, to belabour the point, the 2016 South China Arbitration decision has not ruled over the status of China’s Nansha Qundao. The most possible reason why it did not is it will implicate issues of territorial sovereignty, which is outside the jurisdiction of the tribunal.

Furthermore, Professor Sands, one of the lawyers of the Philippines, made a manifestation during the South China Sea arbitration proceedings that the claims of the Philippines are “made entirely without prejudice to China’s territorial assertions, or indeed the territorial assertions of any other state.” This can be found in Sentences 17-21, Page 98 of Transcript Day 1 on Hearing on Jurisdiction and Admissibility on 7 July 2015.

This is further emphasised in Paragraph 153 of Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (20 October 2015): "The Philippines has not asked the Tribunal to rule on sovereignty and, indeed, has expressly and repeatedly requested that the Tribunal refrain from so doing.” And the Tribunal emphasised that the arbitration decision does not aim to “advance nor detracts from either Party’s claim to land sovereignty in the South China Sea.”

What territory? The idiocy of WPS as territory

Back in 2019, former DFA Secretary Alberto del Rosario, ex-Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales, former Supreme Court Justice Antonio Carpio sent a communication to the International Criminal Court (ICC), armed with a grand accusation: Chinese officials should face charges of “crimes against humanity.” Their case? A litany of grievances in the South China Sea:

- Blocking Filipino fishermen from their ancestral waters at Scarborough Shoal, stripping them of their livelihood.

- Ravaging the Spratly Islands with illegal reclamation and artificial island-building, leaving marine ecosystems in ruins.

- Backing destructive fishing by Chinese nationals, turning a blind eye to environmental carnage.

China isn’t even an ICC member, but here’s the twist: the ICC can claim jurisdiction over non-members if the alleged crimes—under the Rome Statute—happen within a member state’s territory. Carpio, Del Rosario and Carpio-Morales seized on this, arguing that these acts unfolded in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf—Scarborough Shoal and the Kalayaan Island Group included—back when the Philippines was still an ICC party.

Their big question for the ICC Prosecutor: Does a state’s EEZ count as its “territory” under Article 12(2)(a) of the Rome Statute—and in international law?

Anyone with a shred of international law knowledge could’ve seen the answer coming a mile away. But it seems Carpio, del Rosario and Carpio-Morales were banking on passion, not precedent—hoping Filipino sentiment might rewrite the rules.

Cue the ICC Prosecutor, stepping in like a professor schooling overeager freshmen. Here’s the brutal takedown:

1. Territory 101: The Rome Statute doesn’t define “territory,” but it’s clear—it’s where a state holds sovereignty. That’s the land, internal waters, territorial sea, and the airspace above. Full stop. That’s the global standard under international law.

2. EEZ? Not Even Close: Maritime zones like the EEZ and continental shelf? They’re not territory. Sovereignty means exclusive, top-to-bottom control. Beyond the territorial sea, coastal states get only “sovereign rights”—limited powers, not the whole deal. The *Island of Palmas* case nailed it: sovereignty is about supreme authority over a patch of the planet. EEZs don’t qualify.

3. Sovereignty vs. Rights: The law of the sea draws a hard line. Sovereignty covers internal waters and the territorial sea—where a state rules supreme. Beyond that? You’re in “international waters,” where coastal states get specific perks under UNCLOS—like resource rights in the EEZ or continental shelf—but nothing close to full control. No amount of wishful thinking changes that.

Oh, and “West Philippine Sea”? Didn’t even get a cameo in the ICC’s lecture.

The result? A masterclass in legal reality, delivered cold on pages 14-16 of the ICC Prosecutor’s report. Carpio, Del Rosario and Carpio-Morales walked in with a dream; they left with reality check.

But that EEZ is NOT territory is well-established in international law! Even the United States KNOW THIS FACT.

In Koru North America v. United States (1988), decided by the United States Court of International Trade, it emphasized that “sovereign rights are not the equivalent of sovereignty.” It further clarifies:

So we are left with a piercing question: Why do the major pundits, paraded across Filipino mainstream media, relentlessly parrot the claim that the West Philippine Sea is EEZ, hence territory? What is the source of this blatant falsehood—this deliberate distortion of reality?

To withhold these from the Filipino people is not merely deception; it is a national lobotomy, a surgical excision of our collective clarity. It condemns us to stumble blindly in the shadow of lies, robbed of the knowledge that could awaken a nation from sleepwalking into the same tragic fate as Ukraine.

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